We analyze the per capita output growth performance since 1960 of countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and assess the respective contributions of production factors and pro- ductivity measured by total factor productivity (TFP), the overall efficiency with which accumu- lated factors are utilized. Using a worldwide panel of countries, we find, first, strong evidence that, relative to countries with the same output per capita, LAC countries have a large average per capita growth shortfall (of 0.7% per annum) that is almost entirely driven by subpar produc- tivity growth. This finding holds across LAC countries. Second, while the growth performance of LAC countries has generally improved substantially since 1990, regional productivity growth remains subpar, and the productivity gap with respect to the United States has widened in vir- tually all LAC countries. We then ask to what extent income inequality is statistically associated with productivity growth and, in this way, shed light on the nature of the region's growing pro- ductivity shortfall. We find that, in fact, the high Gini index of disposable income in LAC countries goes a long way to account for the subpar productivity growth. However, high inequality is also associated with a high rate of factor accumulation and does not account for the region's poor per capita output growth.

I study the effect of noncompete agreements (noncompetes) on aggregate productivity growth. I build a dataset matching venture capital funded startups to the previous employers of their founders. It exhibits a statistically and economically significant relationship between incumbent R&D spending and employee startup formation in the same industry (within-industry spinouts). Motivated by this finding, I develop and quantify a general equilibrium model of endogenous growth with R&D-induced within-industry spinouts and noncompetes. In the quantified model, eliminating restrictions on noncompetes increases the annual growth rate by 0.21 percentage points and social welfare by 3.24% in consumption-equivalent terms. A subsidy to R&D spending reduces growth and welfare. Both mechanisms involve shifting the R&D labor allocation between incumbents and entrants. Sufficiently large R&D subsidies targeted at incumbent innovation can substitute entirely for noncompetes without stifling spinout innovation. Growth is maximized with targeted R&D subsidies of 88% and a ban on noncompetes.

I describe a novel mechanism through which an aging population can be a drag to productivity growth. I describe this mechanism using a general equilibrium model which adds a quality ladders endogenous growth model to Chari & Hopenhayn 1991, "Vintage Human Capital, Growth, and the Diffusion of New Technologies" (CH). In the model, young workers acquire technology-specific human capital on the job, eventually becoming old skilled workers. Old workers cannot accumulate skill in additional technologies. Hence, as technology improves, old skilled workers continue to use obsolete technologies. Moreover, when skilled and unskilled labor are complementary, young workers have an incentive to develop human capital in old technologies. The result of these two forces is slower adoption of new technologies and hence a lower value to an R&D firm of a successful invention. While in CH growth is exogenous, in my endogenous growth framework this reduces R&D spending in equilibrium and hence decreases the growth rate of productivity. Moreover, in contrast with CH, the model has a dynamic inefficiency: workers do not internalize the effect of their human capital accumulation decisions on the rate of technology adoption and hence the incentive to conduct R&D. In this context, a rightward shift in the age distribution of the workforce can either increase or decrease growth through its effect on the rate of technology adoption and hence R&D incentives. On the one hand, a longer life span in the old and skilled state incentivizes young workers to develop human capital in newer, and hence more valuable, technologies at the expense of lower wages when young, as they have a longer time during which to profit from being skilled in that technology. The distribution of unskilled employment shifts towards newer technologies. On the other hand, a longer life span means that the average time since an old worker became skilled increases, so more skilled workers use obsolete technologies. To understand the relative strength of these two mechanisms, I calibrate the model to employer-employee data from Germany, in particular disciplining the model with the joint distribution of employee age and the establishment's technological vintage. Using the quantified model, I consider the implications of an aging workforce for the growth rate of productivity. The relationship between population aging and labor productivity growth is an inverse U-shape: the human capital accumulation incentive effect dominates at first, but is eventually superseded by the effect of aging on the average time since an old person developed their human capital.